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Abstract 
This paper emphasises the linkages between corporate strategy, the 
macroeconomy and the role of industrial policy in this macropolicy context. Whilst 
this is an aspect of industrial policy which is rarely addressed, we suggest that 
there is, in fact, a real and highly significant complementarity, especially in the 
context of modern capitalism, with its distinctive features.  The underlying premise 
is that problems cannot be resolved easily directly at the macro level: appropriate 
industrial policy may be a necessary ingredient in securing better economic 
performance. Current discussions of exchange rate policies and the major 
adjustments required for eliminating external imbalances between the United 
States, China, Japan and Europe would seem to point to this conclusion.  This 
paper emphasises the linkage between corporate strategy, the macroeconomy and 
the role of industrial policy in this macropolicy context, and points to appropriate 
policies that aim to rebalance the economy by shifting towards a more diffuse 
governance structure that deconcentrates strategic decision making and opens up 
the potential for new forces of dynamism. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In 1932, Aldeous Huxley warned against a future in which happiness was a matter of 
consuming mass-produced goods along with lots of soma, a drug created for 
delivering pleasure. Over seventy years on, psychiatrists and neuro-scientists such 
as Wybrow (2005) portray a society in the US that is not very far-removed from 
Huxley’s Brave New World, and one which they liken to a mental patient addicted to 
mass consumption at the expense of relationships with other people.
2
 To pay for this 
increased consumption, Americans have had to work longer hours, which has 
produced a ‘paradox of prosperity’ in that Americans seem too busy to enjoy the 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the L’Institute Graduate Network Workshop in 
Bath in 2005. We are grateful to participants for comments and suggestions, and most especially 
Dan Coffey. 
2
 As Galbraith (1958) observed, advertising provides a powerful instrument for creating wants by 
creating psychological dependency 
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extra goods and services that they consume (The New York Times, 2005).
3
  Leaving 
aside the lack of happiness this has produced
4
, this paper traces the links between 
increased advertising by US corporations under modern capitalism, falling personal 
savings, longer hours worked and a rising trade deficit. It suggests that the decisions 
of elites in giant corporations to engage in extensive advertising and marketing in an 
attempt to overcome the Schumpeterian limits to the growth of the capitalist system 
has actually fuelled a type of dynamism, in terms of overall growth and the take up of 
information and communication technology (ICT) in service industries which has 
boosted productivity, but has come at a cost in terms of longer hours worked, falling 
savings and a rising trade deficit. Such dynamism is therefore vulnerable or flawed in 
that the internal and external imbalances that are building up are increasingly 
recognised as unsustainable by many commentators.  The latter, however, fail to 
appreciate that these macro-level imbalances cannot be rectified without recognising 
the role of corporations in modern capitalism and the decisions made by elites, a 
situation that we characterise as a form of strategic failure. The latter is a situation 
that occurs when strategic decisions (on key economic variables) are taken by 
corporate hierarchies, whose interests conflict with the wider public interest (Cowling 
and Sugden, 1994).  Rather, it is argued that a rebalancing of the economy not only 
requires crucial macro-economic changes to reduce imbalances, but also an 
industrial policy that tackles this concentration of strategic decision-making in giant 
firms.  
 
This paper therefore emphasises the linkage between corporate strategy, the 
macroeconomy and the role of industrial policy in this macropolicy context.  Whilst 
this is an aspect of industrial policy which is rarely addressed, we suggest that there 
is a real complementarity, especially in the context of modern capitalism, with its 
distinctive features. The underlying premise is that problems cannot be resolved 
easily directly at the macro level; appropriate industrial policy may be a necessary 
ingredient in securing better economic performance. Current discussions of 
                                                 
3
 Cowling (2006) looks at this paradoxical situation in more detail, where research suggests that 
life satisfaction declines as work hours increase, yet US workers are working longer hours. He 
argues that more intensive advertising in the US may drive such trends in that it can push people 
away from their underlying (or meta) preferences towards longer hours worked and less saving.  
4
 Wybrow (2005) points to US government figures that show that 30% of US citizens are anxious, 
double the figure of a decade earlier. On happiness and work-life balance, see Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2004) who found that the US has the greatest problems with work-life balance. 
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exchange rate policies and the major adjustments required for eliminating external 
imbalances between the United States, China, Japan and Europe would seem to 
point to this conclusion. 
 
2 Rivalry and Advertising under Modern Capitalism  
 
Modern capitalism is characterised by large dominant corporations in active rivalry 
with each other, in the context of oligopolistic markets. We observe such markets 
wherever we look, and whilst many other production units exist in industrial 
economies, these ‘firms’ exist under the strategic ambit of the small number of 
dominant corporations; their autonomy is more apparent than real. The long-run aim 
of dominant firms is the effective monopolisation of specific industries through 
organic growth, merger or effective coordination with rivals. Somewhat paradoxically, 
rivalry and collusion coexist in such concentrated markets, with the ‘tit-for tat’ 
strategy providing a useful interpretation of such behaviour, on the one hand eliciting 
and rewarding cooperation and on the other providing speedy retaliation (but also 
forgiveness) for non-cooperation (Cowling and Tomlinson, 2005). Rivalry or 
‘competitive behaviour’ is then diverted away from price competition towards product 
and advertising competition, with corporations induced to invest in the market as well 
as production. A key feature of such rivalry is investment in advertising, the retailing 
network and product innovation. This is an attractive alternative for corporations to 
competing directly on price, and has an additional advantage for oligopolistic firms in 
that it will take time for rivals to respond, which in turn allows monopoly profits to be 
made in the meantime. Whilst market share can be gained by such firms, it also 
enables an extension of the market, beyond its current limits, thereby reducing 
competition. Overall, advertising should be seen as a characteristic of corporate 
power, and in turn sustains and enhances such power.
5
    
    
Two recent examples illustrate such behaviour. Gillette (purchased by Procter and 
Gamble (P&G) in 2005 for $57bn, thereby forming the world’s biggest consumer 
products company) has actively sought to expand its market in a number of ways, for 
                                                 
5
 For example, in terms of providing the excess capacity to deter entry. Through interview work, 
Smiley (1998) found investment in advertising, R&D, brand proliferation and distribution as the 
key dimensions of capacity for strategic managers in US industry. 
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example by marketing shaving products to women in the 1990s, and more recently 
marketing extra blades for its razor (Financial Times, 01/02/05). Indeed, P&G is the 
top advertising spender in the US, spending some $2.9bn in 2004 alone (TNS, 
2005).
6
 Another example is the pharmaceutical industry. While ‘big pharma’ 
corporations are routinely praised for investing substantial amounts in R&D 
compared to other industries (and have thereby been ‘rewarded’ by governments 
with extended patent-life protection), this represents only a half of what they spend 
on marketing and distribution (The Observer, 21/03/04). For such reasons, Bailey et 
al (1994) characterised firms such as Glaxo as ‘market driven rather than research 
led’.  Whilst direct firm-to-consumer advertising by pharmaceutical firms is legal in 
the US, it is prohibited in other countries such as Britain, but this has not stopped 
such firms attempting to raise awareness of medical conditions through advertising 
in order to grow the market and thereby create a new demand for the drugs they 
have developed (The Daily Telegraph, 12/11/04).
7
 
 
More generally, if the capitalist system is prone to recession or depression, 
corporations will seek to ward off the implications for themselves, by such means 
(although it should be noted that this is an imperfect method, in that advertising is 
itself cyclical). We thus see very large expenditures by the major US corporations, 
with the top ten spenders alone in the US collectively spending some $18bn in 2004 
on advertising (TNS, 2005).
8
 Such behaviour has led to a substantial surge in 
investment aimed at shaping and extending the market: in 1998 R&D as a proportion 
of GDP was 2.7% while advertising was 2.4% (Euromonitor, 1999; OECD, 1999).
9
 
Not surprisingly, modern capitalism is characterised by an increasing proportion of 
market investment to total investment. This is a particular feature of the most 
advanced capitalist economies, notably the United States. Over the period 1919 to 
1976, advertising expenditure per person in the US rose 150% (Brack and Cowling, 
                                                 
6
 In contrast, P&G reduced R&D expenditure by 20% over 2001-2004 (Business Week, 11/10/04). 
7
 The House of Commons (2005) has been concerned over the growing influence of the large 
pharmaceutical firms, suggesting that “the heart of the problem may be the trend for the industry 
to become ever more driven by its marketing force”. It has called for greater restrictions to be 
placed on medicines promotion by such firms. 
8
 As noted, in 2004 Proctor and Gamble spent $2.9bn on advertising in the US alone, and was 
followed by General Motors ($2.8bn), Time Warner ($2bn), SBC ($2bn), DaimlerChrysler 
($1.8bn), and Ford ($1.6bn) (TNS, 2005). 
9
 It should be noted that R&D includes public investment and is seen as the most dynamic 
element of investment 
Bailey and Cowling final author version for IRAE 
 5 
1983), while more recently Cowling and Poolsombat (2005) cite evidence showing a 
sevenfold increase in total advertising expenditure in the US over the period 1945 - 
2005, or a four-fold increase per capita when the growth in the US population is 
factored in. During the 1990s, total advertising expenditure in current prices is 
estimated to have grown from just under $130bn in 1990 to $215bn in 1999 (US 
Census Bureau, 2000).  In addition, from the 1990s onwards we have witnessed the 
rapid expansion of internet advertising which has only partly substituted for other 
media, but rather has fuelled further overall advertising growth (ZenithOptimedia, 
2006) and has not necessarily led to lower prices for consumers.
10
 Given such 
growth, Li (2003) estimated total advertising expenditure in the US in 2001 to be as 
high as $233bn. On a more narrow definition of ‘major media’ advertising, North 
American advertising expenditures grew from $158bn in 2003 to a projected $192bn 
in 2007, with North America accounting for 42% of global advertising expenditures 
(ZenithOptimedia, 2006). We would expect that globalisation will tend to lead to 
economies converging over time, but for now huge gaps remain, with the US far 
ahead of other economies in its investment on advertising, being ten times that in 
France (European Audiovisual Observatory, in Cowling and Poolsombat, 2005). 
 
3 Impact: Growing and Unsustainable Imbalances 
 
This pressure of advertising and continual new product innovation can be expected 
to induce a higher level of consumption out of current income. This works by creating 
continuing dissatisfaction with present consumption, with wants being created and 
sustained.
11
  While there has been limited exploration of the impact of advertising on 
the macro-economy (as few economists have seen it as significant), where such 
work has been undertaken it has found advertising to have a significant positive 
impact on propensities to consume (see Taylor and Weiserbs, 1972). The rising 
levels of advertising expenditure through the twentieth century noted above will have 
thus increased levels of private consumption at the expense of savings.  
                                                 
10
 Daripa and Kapur (2001) argued that the tendency for e-commerce to increase price 
competition was overstated and that industrial structures may become more concentrated in 
online markets. 
11
 It can also been seen as shifting preferences in favour of private consumption rather than 
public consumption, and perhaps reduces the willingness of citizens to ‘pay’ for the latter through 
taxation. This in turn may put a limit on what is seen as the ‘legitimate’ extent of government 
activity.  
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In so doing, increased advertising exacerbates short-termist pressures in capitalism, 
in that present needs become more pressing, and making allowance for future needs 
can be postponed. As people procrastinate, we observe low levels of saving and 
pension crises. Whilst affecting several economies, this is again most acutely 
observed in the United States. Here, there has been a low propensity for households 
to save, with saving only taking place to finance consumption of household durables 
(Ruggles, 1993). Furthermore, the debt levels of US households have grown 
considerably over the last thirty years, despite the US government creating some 
twenty tax breaks to encourage savings since 1974. As Mishel and Eisenbrey (2005) 
detail, drawing on official US figures, the indebtedness of US households, after 
adjusting for inflation, rose over 35% over the period 2001-2005, leaving the level of 
debt as a percentage of after-tax income at the highest level since US economic 
records began. The US household debt-service ratio (the percent of after-tax income 
that goes to pay off debts) is also at an all-time high of 13.6%. Americans are 
increasingly dependent on borrowed money, with the percentage of spending 
covered by wages and salaries having fallen from 78% in 1980 to 71% in 1990 and 
to 64% by January 2006 (Capital, 05/03/06). Not surprisingly, the personal savings 
rate, which ran at around 10% of disposable income from 1974 to 1984, had fallen to 
around 5% by 1994, and was negative throughout 2005, for the first time in post-war 
US history. By January 2006, the personal savings rate had deteriorated to minus 
0.7% (ibid).
12
  
 
But the impact of modern corporations’ rivalry through advertising does not end with 
a rise in consumption expenditure and a fall in savings at the macro level.  The 
income constraint on consumption can be removed by appropriate adjustments in 
the labour supply, which can be seen as endogenous to corporate power. In other 
words, with the work-leisure choice determined by artificial ‘created’ preferences, we 
                                                 
12
 Some have suggested that the personal savings statistics in the United States are artificially 
low. Nordhaus, for example, in testimony to the US Congress in 2002, suggested that if assets 
such as real estate and equities were included in the savings figures, the savings rate in the 
1990s would be as high as 25%. Yoo (1998) examined the effect of adding in changes in the 
value of households’ assets (notably the rise in equity prices). This broader measure of ‘savings’ 
was found by Yoo to be both higher and more volatile than the personal savings rate, as one 
would expect.  Of key relevance here, though, is that it had little impact on how trends in savings 
should be viewed; Yoo found that this alternative savings measure also showed a declining 
savings rate over 1980-1995, in spite of rising equity prices. 
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can expect a link between the intensity of advertising and hours of work, both per 
week and in terms of participation rates, with people encouraged to offer a larger 
fraction of their time to the generation of private income for private consumption.
13
  
Again, although there has been limited work on the link between advertising and the 
labour supply, this is exactly what we find.  Brack and Cowling (1983) found that the 
length of the work year for labour in US manufacturing was strongly influenced by 
advertising intensity, with an elasticity of 0.18 over the period 1919 to 1976. Put 
another way, advertising had the effect of increasing the working year in the US by 
27% over the period. This work on the United States has been updated and 
extended by Cowling and Poolsombat (2005), whose results demonstrate the 
possibility that “high observed hours of work was the result of a desire by workers to 
work longer due to a shift in their preferences from leisure to increased consumption, 
caused by the huge increase in advertising”. Similar effects have been found for 
Britain over the period 1952 to 1997: Fraser and Paton (2003) found advertising to 
be positively associated with hours worked for both males and females. They reach 
the same conclusion, linking longer hours worked with a “shift in preferences from 
leisure to increased consumption, caused by the huge increase in mass media 
advertising”.  
 
It is a highly salient characteristic of the United States that hours of work are now 
much higher than in Europe: Americans work around 50% more than do the 
Germans, French and Italians (Prescott, 2004). As with savings, which have been 
declining over time, this desire by Americans to work longer hours has been 
increasing relative to other countries over time. In the early 1970s, West Europeans 
actually worked more than Americans, but by 1994, however, Americans averaged 
20% more work time than adult Germans (Bell and Freeman, 2001). Whilst 
Europeans have reduced their hours of work over time as productivity has risen, US 
workers have at least maintained, if not increased, theirs. Bell and Freeman noted 
that standard labour supply analyses were unable to explain such shifts and 
suggested that high rewards to success combined with a low social safely net and 
the lack of job security in the US explained such long hours. Drawing on Cowling and 
Poolsombat (2005), we would stress another causal factor, namely the rapid 
                                                 
13
 It was Duesenberry (1967) who asked “why do people spend so much of their time at work?” 
Bailey and Cowling final author version for IRAE 
 8 
increase in advertising expenditure fuelling rising consumption expenditure and a 
desire by Americans to work longer in order to consume more. This would imply 
another area of corporate control over the economy, with a labour force more pliable 
to corporate interests and, coming back to Huxley’s gloomy vision, more compliant 
and less likely to rebel.   
 
On the external side, the rise in consumption and reduction in savings have 
contributed to the creation of a huge current account deficit, with the US currently 
absorbing 70% of the current account surpluses of the rest of the World (largely 
China and Japan).
 14
 The global economy is seen as increasingly vulnerable to these 
imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004; IMF, 2006). With a current account deficit of 
6% of GDP, the potential risks in terms of a collapse of the dollar have grown 
considerably larger in recent years. In this regard, Obstfeld and Rogoff see the 
current trajectory as “particularly precarious”, seeing close parallels with the 1970s, 
when the Bretton Woods system collapsed. They also stress that an easy re-
balancing without pain is more difficult to achieve in the context of a current account 
deficit which adds up to 20% of US traded goods production.
15
  Interestingly, Al-Eyd 
et al (2005) make the critical point that a sustained adjustment in the US current 
account deficit cannot be achieved through a temporary nominal depreciation of the 
dollar alone, but also requires a number of other actions to redress government and 
household imbalances in the United States and to increase national savings (El-Ayd, 
2005).  They are especially concerned by the falls in US savings, inflows of foreign 
savings and levels of investment as well as rising consumption.  
                                                 
14
 Chinese holdings of dollar denominated assets reached over $800 billion at the start of 2006, 
while the US trade deficit with China rose to over $200 billion in 2005. This is in line with 
projections by Bonner and Wiggin (2005) who argued that the US cannot stop itself going further 
into debt through such high levels of expenditure. In so doing, they drew parallels between the 
US and the last days of the Roman Empire. In contrast, Bernancke (2005) claimed that the 
problem is a global savings glut rather than a US savings shortfall, but this is refuted by Frankel 
(2006) who notes that global investment rates are actually well down on levels seen in the 1980s, 
a scenario consistent with a US shortfall sucking in capital from the rest of the world. 
15
 Britain has similar problems in terms of high consumption levels, low savings and a 
deteriorating trade deficit. With reduced consumer confidence in 2005, it was hoped that exports 
would pull up overall growth rates but such export-led growth failed to materialise, partly because 
of the continuing over-valuation of sterling. The continuing de-industrialisation of the UK economy 
may have effectively closed off such an export-led growth option anyway, with manufacturing now 
accounting for well under 20% of GDP. Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) suggest that such 
deindustrialisation may have now gone too far. Too much manufacturing capacity may have been 
shed, and the failure to develop a more dynamic manufacturing sector may have “serious 
consequences for the balance of payments and prosperity”. 
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Achieving this broader rebalancing requires the recognition that the strategies of 
Corporate America (interacting with a compliant government) are critical in creating 
these imbalances and potential instability. Tackling this underlying problem therefore 
calls for a rebalancing of the industrial base in the US; this is easier to achieve via 
the use of industrial policy rather than relying solely on macro policy. The latter is 
anyway very challenging (see Brittan in Financial Times, 21/01/05). Buttressing such 
macroeconomic measures with an industrial policy aimed at re-balancing would, we 
suggest, improve the chances of success considerably. 
 
4 Recent Industrial Performance in the US and Europe 
 
Despite these pressing internal and external imbalances, the United States is often 
held up as a role model for the rest of the world, both for its record on employment, 
and for its recent dynamism in terms of GDP and productivity growth. In the macro 
context we can see demand-side investment as being necessary to achieve this 
outcome, where the state is constrained. The general retreat from Keynesianism can 
be expected to induce this sort of capitalist response, in effect trying to replace 
Keynesian demand management with internal demand management. So-called 
‘Golden Ages’ can thus be seen either as the result of state augmentation of 
capitalist expenditure or as a “purer” capitalist creation, made out of its own internal 
mechanism to cure any problem of demand side weakness. The United States is 
closer to the purer form of capitalism managing itself, at least in a microeconomic 
sense, but it has also managed to retain a semblance of Keynesian rules, in 
particular through the operation of a Federal Reserve which has taken a broad view 
of its role and has emphasised economic growth as well as fighting inflation. In 
contrast, the EU has in effect abandoned such rules, in particular through the 
imposition of the Stability and Growth Pact and an excessively restrictive inflation 
target for an unaccountable European Central Bank. Somewhat perversely, 
therefore, the United States now has a greater dynamism within its own capitalist 
system and thus has less need for the state to augment demand, yet in practice it 
appears less constrained than Europe about such intervention. Meanwhile, because 
Europe now has less internal dynamism it actually requires more augmentation of 
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demand, yet is more constrained given the economic rules it has adopted.  Many, 
including the IMF, are now suggesting that Europe and Japan should take over as 
demand-side drivers of the global economy, as part of the global rebalancing that is 
required.   
 
The problems and challenges facing the US and Europe are therefore now quite 
different. On the one hand, Europe is losing a dynamism it formerly possessed. On 
the other, the US is creating an enormous international imbalance (related to its 
internal imbalances) which is increasingly unsustainable.  As Blanchard (2004) has 
noted, this pessimism in Europe is “based on evolutions since the mid-1990s, and 
the feeling that the US is again gaining advance on Europe”. Yet we need to be 
careful in making sweeping generalisations. The much-acclaimed recent superior 
performance of the US is, in fact, based on only a few years evidence (since 1995), 
whereas European performance had been superior over the previous half-century in 
closing the ‘productivity gap’. What would appear to have happened is a slippage in 
European performance recently, combined with evidence of a US industrial 
renaissance (Best, 2001).  Superior US productivity growth in ICT-using industries 
has become a particular focus for attention. The key difference in performance 
recently, between US and Europe, has really been in the service sector (comprising 
retailing, wholesaling, and financial services).  Here there has been a superior 
performance in labour and total factor productivity growth in US (O’Mahoney and 
Van Ark, 2003), and the US appears more effectively to have deployed ICT in these 
sectors in particular.
16
   
 
We suggest that this growth in productivity in US service sectors and the take up of 
ICT has been connected to the consumer boom in the US described above, in that 
the banking, retailing and wholesaling sectors have had both the incentive to take up 
ICT in order to raise productivity in the context of rising demand, and have also had 
the resources to invest in such ICT. In this sense, the ICT take up and productivity 
boost is connected with the growth of the imbalances in the US economy. We 
question whether the superior performance in productivity would have been 
                                                 
16
 Annual labour productivity growth over 1995-2001 in distributive trades was 5.1% in the US as 
against 1.0% in EU15, and in financial services it was 5.2% in the US as against 2.8% in EU15 
(O’Mahoney and Van Ark, 2003) 
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observed without the imbalance in demand. In other words, the increase in 
consumption, fall in savings, and growth in the external imbalance, have fuelled a 
form of dynamism in the economy. However, as noted, the imbalances are becoming 
so large that they need to be addressed as a matter of priority and it is unlikely this 
can be achieved with only macroeconomic adjustment as the imbalances are rooted 
in the basic structure of the economy.  Despite differences in economic performance, 
there might therefore be a deeper policy convergence between the US and Europe. 
In the US case, a policy is required that is industrial and macroeconomic, directed at 
addressing the vulnerable dynamism where that dynamism appears to be linked to 
enormous external (and internal) imbalances. Meanwhile, the strategies of Corporate 
Europe are lacking in dynamism and policies are required to stimulate alternative 
forms of dynamism and that provide a different rebalancing of the industrial base 
emphasising a new European entrepreneurship which is more able to take an active 
place in the global new economy. We will discuss below what form such policies 
might take but before then we need to consider exactly what type of dynamism the 
US has retained. 
 
5 Revisiting the Dynamics of Capitalism 
 
In his seminal 1943 volume ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’, Schumpeter 
argued that capitalism (unlike socialism) had a built-in mechanism for growth and 
dynamism.
17
 This was because capitalist entrepreneurship was fuelled by the 
constant search for the temporary monopoly profits arising from successful 
innovation and bringing products to market ahead of rivals. This “perennial gale of 
creative destruction” involving the creation and destruction of temporary monopoly 
positions was the driving force of capitalism, he argued, and it was this process 
which drove up average levels of productivity and prosperity over time. Schumpeter 
                                                 
17
 Whilst Schumpeter’s work does not fit within the mainstream neo-classical approach, it 
influenced much of the later work on the innovation process which has become widely accepted. 
As Petit (1996) noted, there was something of a revival from the 1970s onwards of the 
Schumpeterian view that innovation is a driving force in market competition. This neo-
Schumpeterian structuralist tradition includes those such as Nelson and Winter (for example 
1974, 1982) who concentrate on the microeconomics of market developments and others such as 
Freeman and Soete (for example 1987) who stress the macroeconomics of long term cycles.  
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rightly saw Soviet-style top-down socialism as lacking such dynamic tendencies, 
being centralised, bureaucratic and non-entrepreneurial.
 18
    
 
Despite having identified this process of “creative destruction” as the key to 
understanding what underpins dynamism in capitalism, Schumpeter is perhaps most 
remembered for his answer to the question he asks in his 1943 volume: “Can 
Capitalism survive? No. I do not think it can”.  By this he meant that it would 
ultimately fail. He identified a number of tendencies which would cause this. Firstly, 
high levels of prosperity would bring a dwindling demand for new products and 
processes. Secondly, there would be less need for entrepreneurship and less 
willingness to tolerate the economic turmoil and insecurity that he felt would 
accompany material progress. Thirdly, routine bureaucratic management would be 
all that would be needed in large corporations, and socialism was perfectly able to 
provide this. The dominance of large corporations, he suggested, would usurp the 
innovative function of entrepreneurs.  All of these tendencies would be reinforced, he 
argued, by the cultural contradictions inherent in modern capitalism, including the 
tendency to alienate intellectuals (Hanson, 1990).  Indeed, Schumpeter saw the 
decay of social support for capitalism as critical in his envisaged decline of 
capitalism. This social-support dimension may have significance in terms of the 
fusion of the public, private and social spheres that has been witnessed in more 
decentralised and successful systems such as the Italian industrial districts. 
 
A particular concern for Schumpeter was that the “perfectly bureaucratized giant 
industrial unit not only ousts the small or medium sized firm and “appropriates” its 
owners but in the end it also ousts the entrepreneur” (Schumpeter, 1943: 134).  
Linked to this, the innovative function of entrepreneurs would, he felt, become 
routinised in the large corporation: “technological progress is increasingly becoming 
the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out what is required and make 
it work in predictable ways… economic action tends to become depersonalised and 
                                                 
18
 Of relevance here, this Schumpeterian world is dominated by monopoly capitalism, where large 
corporations are aware of their market power and actively use it. Indeed, Schumpeter expected to 
see non-price forms of competition such as advertising and even anti-competitive practices such 
as price-fixing, investment in excess capacity to deter market entry by rivals, or taking over 
competitors as common place (Coe and Wilber, 1985). His view of what capitalism actually 
involves seems remarkably prescient today in terms of rivalry between giant firms.  
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automated. Bureau and committee work tends to replace individual action” (ibid, 132-
133).  For these reasons, Schumpeter felt that “there is inherent in the capitalist 
system a tendency toward self-destruction which, in its earlier stage, may well assert 
itself in the form of a tendency towards a retardation of progress”, which might be 
interpreted crudely in terms of a reduction of relative R&D expenditure over time. 
 
The prevailing wisdom is that Schumpeter ‘got it wrong’ (see for example Heilbroner, 
1981); after all capitalism increasingly dominates the global economy. The analysis 
above, which explores the forces in modern capitalism, suggests that US style 
monopoly capitalism in some sectors at least may thus have found a way to 
overcome the Schumpeterian limits to dynamism through competing via high levels 
of advertising, thereby forming and reforming demand preferences which in turn 
leads to rising expenditure (and debt) plus longer hours worked. Such rapid growth 
in advertising as a way of maintaining demand as prosperity rises was not something 
that Schumpeter had anticipated despite his recognition of non-price forms of 
competition.  
 
Others researchers did anticipate such trends in advanced capitalism. Most notably, 
Sweezy (1972) stressed the tendency of monopoly capitalism to “secular stagnation” 
and recognised the need for strong counterveiling forces to enable the system to 
operate at a “politically tolerable” level of production and employment. Such forces, 
he argued, are generated within the economy, through non-price competition such 
as advertising and contrived obsolescence; “in this way a huge sales effort… 
increases the effective demand for goods and services” (ibid: 9). From this 
perspective, the relative level of “unproductive activity” in advanced capitalism would 
be expected to rise over time (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). Such an expansion in 
unproductive activity in the post-war US economy was charted and analysed by 
Wolff (1987), whose definition of such activity included ruling, warfare, religion and 
controlling circulation (including the growth of advertising, most notably in the 1947-
58 period). Wolff’s estimates for the US suggest that all of the increase in 
employment in the between 1947 and 1967 was in this unproductive activity, and he 
found a strong inverse relationship between unproductive activity and net capital 
formation.  Yet Wolff’s supply-side work differed sharply with the demand 
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management approach of Baran and Sweezy. The latter emphasised the demand 
management dimension of unproductive expenditures, especially defence, in filling 
the inevitable slack in effective demand in advanced capitalism, thereby ensuring full 
employment and stimulating growth, capital formation and productivity growth. In 
contrast, Wolff looked at the disposition rather than realisation of surplus value, and 
took the view that unproductive activity decreased the resources available for capital 
accumulation, thereby slowing productivity and overall growth. Put another way, 
Wolff (187:22) saw his approach as looking at the damaging dynamic effects of the 
growth in unproductive activity whereas Baran and Sweezy examined the static 
implications for demand. As Cowling (2004) notes, Wolff seems to address the 
symptoms of a deeper malaise whose cure has yet to be identified. 
 
In a sense this paper attempts to provide a bridge between the two approaches, in 
that we attempt to recognise and link both demand- and supply-side effects. In so 
doing, we note the demand side effects of ‘unproductive activities’ such as 
advertising in boosting demand and see this as having providing a market incentive 
for certain US service sectors to use ICT, which in turn has had a supply-side effect 
in raising productivity in those sectors. On the latter, Wolff’s approach also has 
resonance in the sense that monopoly capitalism in the US has retained a type of 
dynamism through rapidly rising advertising and debt-financed consumption. 
However, this form of dynamism is, we suggest, flawed or vulnerable (analogous to 
Wolff’s damaged dynamism) because of the scale of the internal and external 
imbalances built up in the US economy. Rising levels of private debt and the trade 
deficit are increasingly seen as unsustainable and require changes that go beyond 
pulling macro-economic levers such as adjustments in interest rates, the fiscal 
stance or the exchange rate. It is important to recognise that this form of non-price 
competition, i.e. high levels of advertising expenditure, chosen by monopoly capital 
is a strategic decision. The strategic decisions to spend such large and increasing 
amounts of advertising expenditure have been taken by the key decision-makers in 
the giant enterprises which constitute oligopolistic industries.  It is to this which we 
turn next. 
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6 A Strategic Choice Perspective 
 
Schumpeter’s view that top-down planning in giant corporations was a ‘version of 
central planning’ (Samuels, 1985) is a view not dis-similar to that of modern 
commentators on corporate governance (see Kay, 1997). Similarly, his concern over 
the dominance of large corporations and their damaging effect in usurping the 
innovative function of small-scale entrepreneurs has parallels with the concerns 
raised by those working from the more contemporary strategic choice perspective. 
Planning was a key aspect of Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm, where the latter 
were viewed as ‘islands of planning’. In modern language, this power to control 
planning can be seen as the power to make strategic decisions over the broad 
objectives and direction of the firm. Exactly who controls a firm in this way has been 
the subject of much debate amongst economists: some argue, in line with Berle and 
Means’ (1932) early work, that corporate control remains with (senior) managers, 
others focus on certain powerful shareholders, whilst others see such groups as 
basically the same people anyway. Whilst recognising the possibility of 
‘heterogeneity’ across firms in terms of the exact composition of elites, there is a 
consensus amongst economists that control of firms “rests with a subset of those 
having an interest in a firm’s activities, and certainly does not rest with the workforce. 
Strategic decision-making is concentrated in the hands of an elite” (Cowling and 
Sugden, 1999) 
 
Underpinning this approach, a distinction is drawn between ‘corporate’ and 
‘community’ strategies. ‘Corporate’ strategies are viewed as strategies for 
development conceived by and in the interests of strategic decision makers within 
giant firms, whereas ‘community’ development strategies are those devised by and 
in the interests of a wider set of actors in the community (Sugden and Wilson, 2002). 
The implication is that if strategic decision-making is the preserve of only a few, there 
arises the potential for ‘strategic failure’, where the objectives of the elite making 
strategic decisions conflict with wider interests in society, with the result that the 
economic system fails to deliver the most appropriate outcomes for the community.  
The risks of such strategic failure are seen as more likely when deregulation and 
liberalisation create increased freedom from intervention by government, workers 
and others (greater ‘negative’ freedom) for strategic decision-makers in giant firms 
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over strategic issues such as advertising and marketing expenditure, investment, 
research and development, output, employment and so on. As control over such 
decisions becomes more firmly enshrined in the hands of a few elite decision makers 
within increasingly dominant and mobile firms, the risks of ‘strategic failure’ become 
more likely, with the objectives of the elites making those strategic decisions 
conflicting with wider interests in society (Cowling and Sugden, 1998, 1999). 
Precisely because so-called ‘free markets’ concentrate strategic decision-making in 
the hands of elites, “development paths based upon an especially prominent role for 
transnational corporations are inherently problematic” (Cowling and Sugden, 1999).   
 
The implication of this analysis is that the form of non-price competition chosen by 
monopoly capital, i.e. high and growing levels of advertising expenditure, is in 
essence a strategic decision taken by such firms. The growth of this form of 
unproductive activity (expenditure on advertising) used to shape preferences and 
work-leisure choice is actually determined in a top-down way by concentrated elites 
of decision-makers in giant firms as an alternative to price competition. This outcome 
and social waste, whilst providing the stimulus for the adoption of new technologies 
in service sectors (via high levels of demand), is actually an example of strategic 
failure, with the internal and external imbalances identified above being the side 
effects of this strategic decision by elites.  Whilst monopoly capitalism may have 
overcome the Schumpeterian limits to dynamism by such strategic choices by elites 
of decision makers to increase advertising, this has come at a cost in terms of longer 
hours worked, rising debt, falling savings, and deeply unbalanced international trade. 
Industrial policy needs not only to ameliorate these costs but also needs to address 
the issues that Schumpeter identified sixty years ago; the shift under advanced 
capitalism from a diffuse, entrepreneurial system of small firms to giant corporations 
in monopoly capitalism which in turn concentrates decision-making. A deep, 
structural change in the economy is required in order to tackle this very problem. 
 
7 Beyond ‘Vulnerable Dynamism’ through a ‘New’ Industrial Policy? 
 
Such a view has implications for public policy at different levels; the multi-national, 
national and sub-national scales of analysis.  It implies that the problem of strategic 
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failure is likely to be a real issue for economies in terms of centralised decision-
making leading to the systemic problems noted above, requiring purposive policy 
responses both to deal with the consequences and to avoid such failures.
19
  This 
would require policies to be designed, implemented and assessed in terms of how 
far they move the economy towards more democratic forms of economic governance 
(meaning the processes and structures for identifying and making choices over 
strategy). Facilitating such a radical restructuring of the economy would require a 
multi-faceted approach, involving the monitoring of the giant transnational firms at 
the multi-lateral and national level, the development of bottom-up strategies 
facilitating the participation of wider community groups, the promotion of multilateral 
small webs (Sugden, 1997, Cowling and Sugden, 1999) as a means of diffusing 
strategic decision-making as well as a broader conceptualisation of the nature of the 
free market involving a ‘positive’ (‘the right or ability to’) dimension of economic 
freedom as well as the ‘negative’ dimension, thereby stressing the role of 
participatory democracy in strategic decision-making.   
 
Despite much talk of a ‘new’ industrial policy in the EU and Japan, the emphasis of 
much economic analysis remains focused narrowly on the fine-tuning of macro-level 
policies. The thrust of this paper is to suggest that the scale of imbalances built up 
through the flawed or vulnerable dynamism of advanced capitalism needs much 
more than such macro-level fine-tuning. In particular, industrial policy needs to be 
brought centre-stage to economic policy, as an underlying feature of this ‘vulnerable 
dynamism’ perspective is the very industrial structure of advanced capitalism. In 
particular, the concentration of strategic decision making in giant firms has resulted 
in strategic failure taking a number of forms, including the choice by oligopolistic 
elites to spend large and increasing amounts on advertising, thereby shaping and re-
shaping demand preferences. 
 
Macro-level adjustments on trade, the budget and consumption and investment are 
necessary (but, we argue, not sufficient) in terms of overcoming such imbalances. 
Such adjustments do represent an important aspect of providing a temporary and 
short-term macro-level rebalancing of the economy. Indeed, the concentrated 
                                                 
19
 Of course, it cannot be assumed that state intervention will improve matters as the latter could 
be used by powerful corporations to further their own interests (Cowling and Sugden, 1999) 
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industrial structure cannot anyway be dismantled without losing a form of dynamism 
(albeit vulnerable), which would impact on productivity and overall growth. As 
Cowling (2004) notes, simply holding back on the ‘unproductive activities’ that Wolff 
(1987) identified, such as advertising, the law and war, does not in itself guarantee a 
more dynamic economy. Rather, alongside short-term macro responses, more long-
term and deep-rooted structural reforms are required to the industrial structure so as 
to shift the structure of the economy from monopoly capitalism to a more diffuse 
pattern of strategic decision making, which could unleash alternative sources of 
dynamism. 
 
A number of policy issues flow from this analysis and whilst beyond the scope of this 
paper to go into detail, it is important that we identify their broad direction and 
relevance so as to stimulate a more fruitful debate. The first objective of policy 
should be to broaden strategic decision making so as to avoid strategic failure. This 
would involve a ‘dual approach’ which works within the shadow of the dominant 
regime to ameliorate the most corrosive effects of strategic failure whilst 
simultaneously building a more positive and dynamic form of capitalism built around 
small firm webs.
20
  For example, in recognising the dominance of giant firms, certain 
‘negative’ restraints such as limits on the level and form of advertising, as well as 
mergers, may be appropriate. However, it should be noted at the outset that such 
negative restraints have a specific and limited role for two reasons. Firstly, they will 
be vigorously opposed by the dominant corporations. Secondly, powerful firms will 
find ways around such advertising restraints, as may be observed in the 
pharmaceutical sector.  Overall, given the entrenched power of monopoly capitalism, 
we need to recognise the limits of what such ‘negative’ restraints might achieve.   
 
Nevertheless, innovative ‘negative’ policies that attempt to shift away from 
concentrated or elite decision-making may be relevant. In the US case, an 
interesting possibility has been suggested by Medlen (2005), who notes that over the 
last thirty years the excess cash of US corporations approximates the negative 
saving gap in the non-corporate sector.
21
 He suggests raising taxes to claim back the 
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 This is similar to the ‘dual approach’ to development suggested by Sugden and Wilson (2002). 
21
 Leaving aside the issue of whether households can actually “pierce the corporate veil”, 
household and corporate savings decision are linked (see IMF, 2006). 
Bailey and Cowling final author version for IRAE 
 19 
‘free cash’ of US corporations and redirecting the cash towards the saving-
investment gap of the non-corporate sector, such as into housing, mass transit or the 
small business sector. This could have the benefits of maintaining aggregate 
demand, curbing wasteful and speculative expenditure by corporations on takeovers, 
encouraging the development of small firms and reducing the cost of housing, 
thereby freeing up household resources for expanded saving. 
 
Beyond this, more positive ‘bottom-up’ measures are required in terms of pro-
actively growing a more diffuse system of entrepreneurship that fuses the public and 
private, and avoids the risk of strategic failure. This should be the broad strategic 
goal towards which a range of new policies need to be developed and coordinated. 
Crucially, this would require policymakers moving beyond the Porterian view of 
‘clusters’ and ‘cluster policy’ - which has been both superficial in its analysis and 
confused in its policy-relevance (Martin and Sunley, 2003) - towards a more 
sophisticated and detailed understanding of relationships within and across different 
‘clusters’, focusing in particular on the governance structures required in order to 
avoid ‘top down’ concentrated strategic decision-making and strategic failure. 
Building webs of small firms, where strategic decision making is more diffuse, should 
be a focus for policy, initially by encouraging existing local production systems to 
look outwards to other systems, and then to build multi-locality webs underpinned by 
mental proximity. Multi-locality webs are seen as a potential alternative to the top-
down control of giant firms, and would be large-scale production processes 
comprising a myriad of smaller firms in a nexus of criss-crossing relationships which 
span borders – in other words, multi-local (rather than a transnational controlled) 
production processes (Sugden, 1997, Cowling and Sugden, 1999). Lessons might 
be learned from experience elsewhere; in order to compete internationally without 
the economies of scale that transnationals enjoy, firms in certain industrial Italian 
districts have cooperated in the collective provision of marketing and other services. 
Such cooperation amongst enterprises could be encouraged and enhanced through 
the provision of support structures and quasi-public goods to webs of small firms. 
These could include specialist services and R&D support, for example via more 
innovative university-web-community relationships.  The latter would have to be 
underpinned by a re-appraisal of the role of universities and a shift away from the on-
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going corporatisation of higher education towards conceptualising universities as 
providing a counterpoint to corporate hegemony. This would require a new sort of 
University, ‘urbi et orbi’: integrated in the industrial economy, based in the locality, 
but looking out, developing a multi-national base. Similarly, the finance system would 
need to be shifted towards a more decentralised form with the dominant objective of 
supporting webs of small firms rather than giant capital.    
 
Positive policy experiences also need to be drawn on in developing new approaches, 
whilst recognising the inappropriateness of simply transplanting policies without 
recognising social and cultural differences. As noted, despite the need for greater 
public intervention in Europe given its lack of dynamism, government intervention in 
the United States has been much more active and creative than is generally 
appreciated. This can be seen in terms of government funding for R&D via the 
university system. In addition there has been the use of a hidden but de facto 
industrial policy via the Pentagon and other areas of government in terms of the 
procurement and stimulation of high-technology products over many years, including 
computers, aerospace and semi-conductors (Geroski, 1990) and more recently dual-
use flat-screen technologies (US Congress, 1995). As Geroski notes, in the case of 
the computer industry, such government action “almost single handedly brought into 
being what has now become an enormous commercial market”. Furthermore, this de 
facto industrial policy of targeting new technologies with widespread civilian 
spillovers has included the use of ‘second sourcing’ to deliberately stimulate a 
diffuse, competitive industry, rather than simply placing orders with giant firms 
(Geroski, 1990). Other areas of intervention include the more generic use of tax-
credits to subsidise ‘private sector’ innovation (Hall and Van Reenan, 2000), 
extensive government support for venture capital (Lerner, 1999) and an ongoing 
willingness to question the value and effects of inward foreign direct investment. On 
the latter, elements of the Bush administration post 9/11 have sought to extend the 
definition of ‘national security’ to protect high technology sectors such as 
telecommunications and the internet from foreign takeovers (Bailey, 2003).  
 
Overall, there has been quite extensive public policy intervention in the United 
States, but this is often opaque and hidden. This industrial policy has involved both 
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vertical measures in targeting new technologies and emerging industries, and 
horizontal measures to support all industries, suggesting that the current focus in 
Britain and the EU with the horizontal aspects of industrial policy has been largely 
misplaced (Bailey and Driffield, 2006). Similarly, Japan is also trying to encourage 
the take-up of new technologies by service sectors and the development of new 
strategic industries. The combination of horizontal and vertical/sectoral measures 
being developed in its “new industrial policy” has led some commentators to suggest 
that Japan is “revisiting the famous government-industry collaboration that served 
them so well in earlier decades” (Genther Yoshida, 2004). This may have relevance 
in the European context, given the desire to re-activate the EU’s ‘Lisbon agenda’. If 
European leaders want to improve the EU’s dynamism in using ICT in services, there 
might be useful lessons to be taken from Japanese experience in terms of how new 
ICTs were spread to users via the Japanese Computer Company from the 1960s 
onwards (Anchordoguy, 1988).
 22
 
 
8 Concluding Comments 
 
Despite much talk of a ‘new’ industrial policy, the emphasis of much economic 
analysis remains focused narrowly on the fine-tuning of macro-level policies. The 
thrust of this paper is to suggest that the scale of imbalances built up through the 
flawed or vulnerable dynamism of advanced capitalism needs much more than such 
macro-level fine-tuning. In particular, industrial policy needs to be brought centre-
stage to economic policy, as an underlying feature of this ‘vulnerable dynamism’ 
perspective is the very industrial structure of advanced capitalism. In particular, the 
concentration of strategic decision making in giant firms has resulted in strategic 
failure taking a number of forms, including the choice by oligopolistic elites to spend 
large and increasing amounts on advertising, thereby shaping and re-shaping 
demand preferences and boosting demand. Whilst bringing benefits in the United 
States in terms of overcoming Schumpeterian limits to growth and driving 
productivity growth via the use of ICT in service industries, this has come at a great 
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 The debate on why an ICT-inspired productivity pick-up has not occurred yet in the EU, in 
contrast to the US, is on-going. One view is that there is a lagged effect, in that the US invested 
first in ICT, and saw productivity gains after only 15 years, whereas the EU invested much later 
and has yet to see a return (see O’Mahoney and Van Ark, 2003). 
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cost, viewed here as a form of strategic failure, in terms of longer hours worked, 
rising debt, falling savings and pension provision, and deeply unbalanced 
international trade. Such internal and external imbalances are increasingly 
unsustainable. 
 
Macro-level adjustments on trade, the budget and consumption and investment are 
therefore necessary (but, we argue, not sufficient) in terms of overcoming such 
imbalances in the US. Alongside these short-term macro responses more long-term 
and deep-rooted structural reforms are required to the industrial structure so as to 
shift the structure of the economy from monopoly capitalism to a more diffuse pattern 
of strategic decision making, which could unleash alternative sources of dynamism. 
Given that the strategies of Corporate Europe are lacking such dynamism, a different 
rebalancing of the industrial base is required that emphasises a new European 
entrepreneurship (which in turn is more able to take an active place in the global new 
economy). In so doing, there is a need to emphasise the development of creative 
clusters of small firms, displacing less dynamic corporate giants, and to diffuse 
strategic decision making across a wider variety of actors. Taken together, these 
could enable a deep, structural change away from the dominance of giant 
corporations in modern capitalism to a diffuse, entrepreneurial system of small firms, 
and might address the very problem that pre-occupied Schumpeter sixty years ago.  
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